

FIGURE 7.3 Connotations of the Four Combinations of Power Distance and Uncertainty Avoidance Levels

(4)	Small Power Distance Weak Uncertainty Avoidance Countries: Anglo, Scandinavian, Netherlands Organization type: implicitly structured ^a	Implicit model of organization: market	(1)	Large Power Distance Weak Uncertainty Avoidance Countries: Southeast Asian	Organization type: personnel bureaucracy	Implicit model of organization: family
			(2)	Large Power Distance Strong Uncertainty Avoidance Countries: Latin, Mediterranean, Islamic, Japan, some other Asian	Organization type: full bureaucracy	Implicit model of organization: pyramid
(3)	Small Power Distance Strong Uncertainty Avoidance Countries: German-speaking, Finland, Israel Organization type: workflow bureaucracy	Implicit model of organization: well-oiled machine				

^aFor the Aston types of organization see Pugh (1976: 70).

of the French tended to resolve the problem by referring to the hierarchy; the British, by horizontal negotiation; the Germans, by the establishment of procedures. Stevens identified the implicit model of a well-functioning organization for the French as a pyramid; for the British as a (village) market; for the Germans as a well-oiled machine. This fits the types of full bureaucracy, implicitly structured organizations, and workflow bureaucracy.

Stevens did not have Asian students available, but, based on the work of Kumar and Singh (1976) on Indian managers, I chose the "family" as the implicit model for an Indian organization. The "personnel bureaucracy" means that relationships among people are strictly determined by the hierarchical framework; but that the workflow is not at all codified to the same extent. The main continuous principle of Chinese administration has been described as "Government of Man" in contrast to the western idea of "Government by Law" (Chang, 1976).

In another of his studies with French, German, and British students, Stevens also drew attention to the different meaning of time in the three countries. For the Germans, it is a source of pressure; they are constantly aware of its passing. For the French, time is a resource which should be controlled and utilized. For the British, time is a tool for orienting oneself.

The industrial relations structures (labor-management relations) of France, Germany, and Great Britain support impressionistically the typology of Figure 7.3. The German labor unions are the most orderly and united; they do not like to strike (uncertainty avoidance), but they have achieved considerable formal co-determination (low power distance). The British are disorderly and have successfully resisted codifying industrial relations rules (no uncertainty avoidance). The French unions

are politically oriented, reasonably orderly (predictable strike behavior), and in majority not very interested in formal co-determination.

As for the first quadrant (Asian countries), we have data from Negandhi and Prasad (1971) comparing 17 Indian organizations with 17 U.S. subsidiaries in India. The Indian organizations tend to have more layers in the hierarchy (1971: 60), but less formal control systems (p. 85), which fits with a distinction on both the power distance and uncertainty avoidance scales (although in the case of control systems, differences in modernization may have played a more important role).

Stressing the cultural element in organizational structure and functioning does not represent an attempt to reduce all differences among organizations to culture. It is only—and I believe this is necessary—a warning that the structure and functioning of organizations are not determined by a universal rationality. Making shoes, producing electricity, or treating the sick in Germany as opposed to France calls for organizational structures and processes that differ in several respects. Technology contributes to the shaping of organizations; but it is insufficient for explaining how they work. There is no "one best way" which can be deduced from technical-economical logic (Brossard and Maurice, 1974; Crozier and Friedberg, 1977: 168).

Culture and Organization Theory

The cultural relativity of the laws that govern human behavior had been recognized as early as the sixteenth century in the skepticism of Montaigne (1533-1592). The quote from Pascal (1623-1662) at the beginning of this book is in fact taken from Montaigne: "*Quelle vérité que ces montaignes bornent, qui est mensonge au monde qui se tient au delà?*"²

The founding parents of the theory of modern organizations, such as Tolstoy (1828-1910), Fayol (1841-1925), Taylor (1856-1920), and Follett (1868-1933), and most of their successors up to the present day, have not followed Montaigne, but have typically looked for universal principles. The paradox is that in their theories the influence of their own cultural environment is clearly recognizable.

Let us take the issue of the exercise of authority. Weber, who was German (and, as his other work shows, quite sensitive about the role of values in society), wrote about authority in a bureaucracy—by which he meant any large organization, public, voluntary, or private: "The authority to give the commands required for the discharge of these duties is distributed in a stable way and is strictly delimited by rules concerning the coercive means . . . which may be placed at the disposal of officials" (from *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, 1921; Part III, chapter 6: 650; English version in Weber, 1970: 196). For Weber, authority is in the office, not in the man.

Fayol, who was French, put it differently:

We distinguish in a manager his *statutory* authority which is in the office, and his *personal* authority which consists of his intelligence, his knowledge, his experience, his moral value, his leadership, his service record, etc. For a good manager, personal authority is the indispensable complement to statutory authority [Fayol 1916 (1970): 21; my translation].

Mary Parker Follett was American. She wrote:

How can we avoid the two extremes; too great bossism in giving orders, and practically no orders given? . . . My solution is to depersonalize the giving of orders, to unite all

concerned in a study of the situation, to discover the law of the situation and obey that. . . . One *person* should not give orders to another *person*, but both should agree to take their orders from the situation [from a paper presented in 1925; in Metcalf and Urwick, 1940: 58-59].

For the same issue of the exercise of authority, Weber stresses the office; Fayol, the person; Follett, the situation. We recognize the different positions of these three authors' national cultures on the Power Distance $\times$ Uncertainty Avoidance matrix. Between the American and the French view, a direct dispute was started elsewhere by Fayol when he took issue with Taylor's proposition of eight functionally specialized superiors for one person. Fayol (1916 [1970]: 84) calls this idea "wrong and dangerous," as it "flagrantly violates" the principle of unity of command. This principle, however, is much more holy in France than in the United States. It must be admitted that U.S. practitioners were not eager to try this idea of Taylor's either; but some of it can be recognized in the modern trend toward matrix organization, which was developed in United States and, not surprisingly, lacks popularity in France (Laurent, 1978).

What is available as organization theory today is mostly written by Americans, and as such reflects the cultural context of one specific society. A collection of 15 contributions by leading Europeans (Hofstede and Kassem, 1976) shows remarkable differences in focus by culture area. Authors from Latin Europe focus on power; from Central Europe, including Germany, on truth; from Eastern Europe, on efficiency; from Northern Europe, on change; while the Western Europeans, in this case British and Dutch, have a bit of all of these but show more than the others a concern with data collection which we also find in the United States.

Theorizing is only a semirational activity. "There are large sections of culture that act as a bar to the free exercise of rationality" (Kluckhohn, 1951: 91, after E. Sapir). Or, as I would rather put it, there is no such thing as absolute rationality; there are different rationalities colored by different culturally influenced values, and your rationality differs from mine; while there is no standard to determine which of the two is more "rational." Culture affects in particular those ideas that are taken for granted without further proof because no one in our environment ever challenges them. Only comparison among cultures can show that other ideas are possible. It has been said that the last thing the fish will discover is water; it only finds out about water when it has landed on the fishmonger's cart. Douglas (1973b) has collected documentary evidence on the relevance of an "anthropology of everyday knowledge": our reality is manmade (Berger and Luckmann, 1966). We also have a natural tendency to choose our environment such that certain of our basic ideas are not challenged. Ideas are entangled with our values and our interests³; a fact which we recognize more easily in others than in ourselves. Ideas and theories become popular or unpopular at a certain time not because they are more or less "true" but because the value systems that support them are activated or suppressed by ecological and institutional developments (more or less in the way pictured by the diagram in Figure 1.4). Thus, Bartell (1976) showed why the "Human Relations Ideology" in the United States developed there at the time it did (the 1930s), putting it in the context of such factors as traditional American values, labor union expansion, the economic depression, the New Deal, and the bureaucratization of industrial organizations.

Motivation Patterns: Uncertainty Avoidance Versus Masculinity

The 40 countries have been positioned in a $UAI \times MAS$ diagram in Figure 7.4. The combination of UAI and MAS was found to be the best predictor of Need for Achievement, as identified by McClelland in his content analysis of 1925 children's readers. The upper righthand quadrant in Figure 7.4 (weak Uncertainty Avoidance and Masculine) corresponds to the highest n_{Ach} as measured by McClelland. The countries of "masculine risk-takers" appear to be the entire "Anglo" cluster, plus, however, some Asian countries: India, Philippines, Hong Kong, and (marginally) Singapore (interestingly, all these are former U.K. or U.S. colonies).

The clustering of the Anglo countries in Figure 7.4 suggests the cultural limitation of McClelland's achievement motivation concept and, at the same time, of other American theories of human motivation, such as those by Maslow or Herzberg (see also Chapter 9). The societal norms for uncertainty avoidance and masculinity affect what will motivate people in different cultures. McClelland's achievement motive or




FIGURE 7.4 Positions of the 40 Countries on the Uncertainty Avoidance and Masculinity Scales

The dendrogram in Figure 7.8 should be read from right to left. A split into two large clusters cuts off Colombia through Philippines from Israel through Finland. Next, the lower cluster splits into Israel through South Africa and Denmark through Finland, and so on.

FIGURE 7.5 Summary of Significant Correlations of HERMES Indices with Data from Surveys with Different Instruments

Zero-order correlation with HERMES index					No. of countries	See page	Survey and Scales	
PDI	UAI	IDV	MAS	Sizable contributions in multiple regression			Narrow samples:	
					19	85	Haire et al. (1966)	Capacity leadership
						128		Sharing information
						161		Participation
					14	162	Haire et al. (1966)	Security
								Autonomy
					17	85	Gordon students (1976)	Support
						187		Conformity
								Recognition
								Independence
					16	128	Hotstede IMEDE (1974b)	Benevolence
								LPC score
					14	84	Hotstede IMEDE (1976a)	
						128		Recognition vs. independence
						161		Decisive vs. practical minded
					12	162	Bass IRGOM managers	Hedonism vs. skill
						197		Assertiveness vs. service

Representative samples:					12	10	Laurent matrix (1978)	Clarity of hierarchy
						6	Bass and Franke (1972)	Openness vs. secrecy
						163	Morris ways to live (1956)	Employment vs. duty
					15	128	Reader's Digest (1970)	Attitude to younger people
								Attitude to older people
					9	129	Ornauer et al. Year 2000 (1976)	Contribute yourself
								Compromise not dangerous
								Take one day after another
								Like living abroad
					9	198	CCE, Retirement (1978)	Prefer salary over shorter working
								Preferred size of enterprise
					6	198	McGee, Free Enterprise (1977)	
								Almond and Verba (1963)
					5	129		Citizen competence

(a) For factor scores, no multiple regressions were computed.

FIGURE 7.7 Summary of Significant Correlations of HERMES Indices with Seven System-(Country)-Level Indicators, Including Multiple and Stepwise Regression on the Four Indices

Multiple and Stepwise Regression on the Four Indices										
order in stepwise regression cumulative R^2 & sign		Squared multiple correlation with all four R^2	Zero-order correlation with HERMES index					Abbr- viation	System-level indicators	
2nd	1st		MAS	IDV	UAI	PDI				
	.67 - MAS ^a	.68 + IDV	.03	.75***	.82***	-.30*	-.65***	GNP	Wealth	All 40 countries
								GNP	Economic growth	
								LAT	Latitude	
								POP	Population size	
								PGR	Population growth	
								PDI	Population density	
								ORG	HERMES org. size	
	.57 + IDV	.51 + IDV	.63	.29	.71***	-.30*	.51***	GNP	Wealth	21 poorer countries
								GNP	Economic growth	
								LAT	Latitude	
								POP	Population size	
								PGR	Population growth	
								PDI	Population density	
								ORG	HERMES org. size	
.66 + PDI	.45 + MAS	.30	-.63**	.45*	.57**	-.44	GNP	Wealth	19 wealthier countries	
							GNP	Economic growth		
							LAT	Latitude		
							POP	Population size		
							PGR	Population growth		
							PDI	Population density		
							ORG	HERMES org. size		
		.21	.42*	.58	.67	.20 + IDV	GNP	Wealth		
							GNP	Economic growth		
							LAT	Latitude		
							POP	Population size		
							PGR	Population growth		
							PDI	Population density		
							ORG	HERMES org. size		
		.41		.27 + PDI	.18 + UAI	GNP	Wealth			
						GNP	Economic growth			
						LAT	Latitude			
						POP	Population size			
						PGR	Population growth			
						PDI	Population density			
						ORG	HERMES org. size			

For definitions of indicators, see Chapter 2.
a. Third-order correlation: .72 + UAI
b. Third-order correlation: .73 + UAI

CULTURE'S CONSEQUENCES

[228]

In order to obtain a meaningful separation of countries with different historical backgrounds and/or geographical positions, I have cut the dendrogram at an error sum of squares of 12 percent of total, which leads to 11 clusters (numbered 1 through 11 in the lefthand column of Figure 7.8).

Most countries which we find together in the same cluster in Figure 7.8 were also together in the clusters drawn impressionistically in the two-dimensional plots of Figures 5.3, 7.2, and 7.4. Exceptions are Italy and South Africa, which were always separated from Germany and Switzerland, as they could also be considered marginal members of more historically related clusters (Latin for Italy and Anglo for South Africa). The computer analysis does not respect historical considerations.

Culture and Language: The Cases of Belgium and Switzerland

In three of the 40 countries the surveys were administered in two languages each: in Belgium, Switzerland, and Yugoslavia. For Belgium and Switzerland, a separate analysis of the two language areas in the data has been possible. The resulting index values for the language areas, as well as those of the neighboring countries with the same languages, are listed in Figure 7.9.

In order to show the similarities and differences among countries and language areas more clearly, the lower part of Figure 7.9 contains the summed absolute differences across the four indices for each pair of countries or areas.

Both Belgium and Switzerland combine Germanic and Latin languages. In Belgium, about 54 percent of the population speaks Dutch, 45 percent French, and 1 percent German. In Switzerland, the figures are about 75 percent German, 20 percent French, 4 percent Italian, and 1 percent Raeto-Romanic.

The index values for the main language areas in Belgium and Switzerland show that in Belgium the two language areas share basically the same culture, which closely resembles the French culture. The culture gap between the Netherlands and Dutch-speaking Belgium is somewhat smaller than between the Netherlands and French-speaking Belgium, but it is still very wide. In fact, no two countries in the HERMES data with a common border and a common language are so far culturally apart, according to the HERMES indices, as Belgium and the Netherlands. The gap occurs in Power Distance, Uncertainty Avoidance, and Masculinity; only in Individualism do Belgium and the Netherlands come together.

A completely different picture is found for the other bilingually surveyed country, Switzerland. In this case, German-speaking Switzerland is clearly culturally associated with Germany and French-speaking Switzerland with France; there is a wide culture gap between the two language areas, in particular on the dimension of Power Distance. The two parts of Switzerland belong to different culture areas. The fact that in the cluster analysis for total countries Switzerland as a whole is part of the Germanic area is simply due to the greater numerical strength of German-speaking respondents in the HERMES sample.

Curiously, the language split is an extremely "hot" political issue in Belgium (where, according to the data, the two areas share largely the same culture) and not in Switzerland (where cultures differ). This is undoubtedly due to the political structure of the countries, which is monolithic in Belgium (an attempt at regionalization is

PROGRAMME Y H A K (H. POIST, GULONE and P. JAGEL, KIEL)
DENDROGRAM, WARDS METHOD. VARIABLES: PDI, UAI, IDV, MAS




FIGURE 7.8 Country Clusters

FIGURE 7.9 Index Values for Bilingual Countries by Language Area, and Their Differences

A. Values of the four indices for language groups in bilingual and neighboring countries					
	PDI	UAI	IDV	MAS	
Belgium total	65	94	75	54	
Netherlands	38	53	80	14	
Belgium Dutch	61	97	78	43	
Belgium French	67	93	72	60	
France	68	86	71	43	
Switzerland total	34	58	68	70	
Germany (F.R.)	35	65	67	66	
Switzerland German	26	56	69	72	
Switzerland French	70	70	64	58	
France	68	86	71	43	
B. Summed absolute differences					
	BEL-D	BEL-F	FRA		
NET	98	123	111		
BEL-D		33	25		
BEL-F			26		
	SWI-G	SWI-F	FRA		
GER	26	51	81		
SWI-G		77	103		
SWI-F			40		

-being carried out) but federal in Switzerland, with more than 20 generally monolingual cantons (provinces) with a large amount of internal independence. In one case, where a Swiss canton was bilingual (Berne), this led in the 1960s to political conflicts not unlike those in Belgium, but these were resolved by splitting the canton (creating the new canton Jura). The political structures of the two countries are in their turn the outcome of historical events: For centuries Belgium was a distant dependent province of foreign powers (successively of Spain, Austria, France, and the Netherlands) and it only gained its independence in 1831. Switzerland was created in 1291 by a voluntary federation of three cantons and grew gradually by the more or less voluntary addition of 19 other cantons, reaching its present size in 1815.

The common French culture of the two language areas of Belgium can be explained by their common history and by the fact that since Belgium split from the Netherlands in 1831, French was the language of government, the upper classes, and secondary and higher education for more than 100 years. The emancipation movement of the Dutch-speaking majority in Belgium gained momentum only in the 1950s.

In my own study with L. V. Gordon's Values Surveys of the values of 315 managers in courses at IMEDE (Hofstede, 1976a), the size of the Swiss sample allowed divid-

Integrating the Four Dimensions

ing it into German-speaking Swiss ($n = 69$) and French-speaking Swiss ($n = 30$). In a cluster analysis, German-speaking Switzerland was part of the Germanic cluster and French-speaking Switzerland part of the Latin cluster. This is the same division as obtained in HERMES. In the IMEDE study all respondents used the same language (English); thus, language alone cannot be the reason for the splitting of the Swiss data in HERMES.

Culture Areas as a Basis for an Emic Study of Cultures

The identification of four dimensions of national culture and the attribution of an index value on each dimension to each country represent an approach to the study of culture which, in the terminology of Chapter 1, is entirely nomothetic-etic. Using the distinction which I attributed to Lammers (page 33) Chapters 3 through 6 have concentrated on "lawlike theories," while the present chapter looks for "configurations."

If we were to take an entirely idiographic-emic view of national cultures, we would consider each culture as an integral whole, which only makes sense from the inside—and we would condemn any attempt at classification across cultures as denying the uniqueness of each culture's *Gestalt*. The identification of culture areas as ideal-types represents an in-between solution between the purely emic position and the extreme etic of the index values. Rather than considering each country culture as an entirely different whole, we recognize that some cultures are more alike than others. The *Gestalt* of national cultures from the same area will present more of the same features than the *Gestalt* of national cultures from different areas.

NOTES

1. The correlation between IDV and MAS must be .00 because these indices are based on orthogonal factors (Chapter 5). In the factor analyses of all questions (Chapter 2) we find three orthogonal factors, of which one represents a mixture of PDI and IDV and the others are not identical with, but approach closely, UAI and MAS. Thus, it is evident that the correlation across 40 countries for UAI and MAS must be low.

2. Montaigne, *Essais* II, XII, 34: "What kind of a truth is this that is bounded by a chain of mountains and is falsehood to the people living on the other side?" (my translation)

3. The stress on interests as the source of ideas is found throughout the works of Marx and Engels, but they focus almost exclusively on the modes of production; Merton (1968: 516ff) shows how Marx's ideas have been broadened by Scheler and Mannheim to include other institutional structures and group formations as existential bases of ideas.

4. Ward's grouping method (Rummel, 1972: 304). The actual computations were done with the program YHAK by Forst and Vogel (1977). This analysis, like the ANOVA in Chapter 2, was made possible through the kind help of Professor Klaus Brockhoff of Kiel University, Germany, and his computer staff.

Chapter 8

TRENDS OVER TIME

mature later, but they remain sensitive to the developments in society (the *Zeitgeist*) to a later age than lower-educated employees (technicians, clerks, and unskilled workers) whose value systems tend to become more rigid after the age of 40. The relationship of individualism and masculinity with age is based on age effects in work goal importance which correspond with those found in the literature.

Finally, a speculative attempt is made to indicate possible longer-term trends; it is suggested that individualism will increase and the Power Distance norm will decrease as long as national wealth increases, that uncertainty avoidance—or at least its anxiety component—fluctuates over time with a 25–40-year wave length, and that masculinity differences among countries will remain large.

The Process of Culture Change

In the first chapter of this book, I pictured in Figure 1.4 how the stability of culture patterns over long periods of time can be explained from their reinforcement by the institutions which themselves are products of the dominant value systems. The system in Figure 1.4 is in a self-regulating quasi-equilibrium: It does change, but generally only slowly. The forces toward change come from the outside, in the form of forces of nature or forces of man: trade, conquest, or scientific discovery.

Scientific discovery, of course, may also take place within the system. Culture itself within a system affects both the inquisitiveness of the members of society and their tolerance for new ideas and therefore the rate of discovery and innovation (Wallace, 1970: 170ff). Until 100–200 years ago, this rate usually was extremely low. Today, the products of scientific discovery (including the mass media) represent the major force of culture change, and for most countries in the world they come mainly or exclusively from outside; that is why in Figure 1.4 I have listed “scientific discovery” as an outside influence (in a strict sense, it also could be put in the “origins” box).

As all countries are gradually exposed to the products of the same scientific discoveries in the form of modern technology, and as these play an important role in culture change, some authors have concluded that all societies will become more and more similar. In the “comparative management” literature of the 1960s we find the “convergence theory,” which implies that management philosophy and practice around the world will become more and more alike. Kerr et al. (1960) stated it even stronger: “The logic of industrialism will eventually lead us all to a common society where ideology will cease to matter.” Such a statement strikes us now as naive and as wishful thinking; a more realistic evaluation of the situation is made by Feldman and Moore (1965), who point out that “the inconsistent elements of pre-industrial systems do not simply disappear, lost without trace” (1965: 262). They are found in particular in the political field: “The political order, almost by operational definition, is the residuary legatee of unsolved social problems.” Feldman and Moore conclude that “surely most of the changes in industrial societies, and certainly the major ones by any crude scale, are disequilibrating rather than equilibrating (1965: 265)—so that we should not expect a kind of end-state equilibrium to which all countries evolve.”

A more sober statement about the process of culture change is therefore that technological modernization is an important force toward change which leads to

SUMMARY OF THIS CHAPTER

One reason for culture change is the proliferation of the results of scientific discoveries, but this does not mean that all cultures will become more and more similar. Different dimensions of culture in different countries may follow different trends, although some trends will be felt worldwide. The HERMES data bank contains data from two points in time (around 1968 and around 1972) and thus can be used to show trends at least for this period. These trends may be due to maturation, seniority, generation, and/or *Zeitgeist* effects; using both longitudinal data and breakdowns by the respondents' age bracket, these can, at least partly, be separated.

It appears that the answers on the three questions composing the Power Distance Index do not shift together over the four-year period, nor do those composing the Uncertainty Avoidance Index; the trend analysis for these two dimensions has therefore been limited to one question in each case, the preferred manager for PDI, and on-the-job stress for UAI. Both show a combined age and *Zeitgeist* effect. The latter points to a decrease of the desired power distance worldwide; only in the low PDI countries is this matched by a corresponding shift in perceived managerial behavior. There is also a worldwide trend toward an increase in stress. The two remaining dimensions, Individualism and Masculinity, show both an increasing trend, which in particular for IDV is quite sharp. There is no sign of convergence between extreme countries (except for the preferred manager); rather, the reverse.

This chapter shows graphically the relationships of preferred manager type, stress, individualism, and masculinity to age, by occupational category, for each of the two survey rounds. Higher-educated employees (managers and professionals)

partly similar developments in different societies. However, it does not wipe out differences among societies and may even enlarge them; as on the basis of preexisting value systems societies cope with technological modernization in different ways.

Studies of the evolution of the culture of modern nations always have to cope with the dichotomies of similarity versus uniqueness and of stability versus change, and usually stress one side of either dichotomy at the expense of the other. The convergence theorists stressed similarity and change. Students of the developments within agency theorists stress uniqueness and stability. Peyrefitte (1976) traces most of the specific countries stress uniqueness and change. Hofstede (1976d) shows that quotes of eighteenth-century visitors to the Netherlands still apply to the Dutch of today; Beteille (1977: 25) refers to the remarkable stability over time of the basic structure of ideas and values in India and China; Inkeles (1977) finds continuity in the American national character ever since the descriptions by Crèvecoeur dating from 1782. The latter is particularly interesting because the United States is a country of immigrants; it shows with amazing clarity that culture is learned, not inborn.

Measuring Culture Change Through Shifts in Values

In the present study I have tried to quantify both the similarities and the uniqueness of cultures; I shall now in the same way try to quantify both stability and change. For this purpose, I can analyze the HERMES data longitudinally (comparing the 1967-1969 to the 1971-1973 survey cycle) as well as by the age brackets of the respondents.

Differences in values among respondents of different ages and/or at different points in time may be due to four different kinds of causes:

- (1) maturation,
- (2) seniority,
- (3) generation, or
- (4) *Zeitgeist*

The difference between 1, 3, and 4 is illustrated in Figure 8.1.

Maturation effects simply mean that respondents' values shift as they grow older. This is pictured in Figure 8.1a. Shifts over time are due only to the aging of respondents; if we choose respondents of the same age, nothing changes.

Generation effects occur when values are fixed in the youth from a certain period and then stay with their age cohort over its lifetime. If the conditions of life during youth have changed drastically, this may lead to different generations having different fixed values (Figure 8.1b).

Zeitgeist effects occur when drastic system-wide changes in conditions cause everyone's values to shift, regardless of age (Figure 8.1c).

In practice, these effects probably will occur in combination; an example is given in Figure 8.1d in which the *Zeitgeist* affects only the younger people and older people's values tend to be determined more by their age and/or generation.

Seniority effects occur when we recruit our respondents from one particular organization, for those values that shift not so much because people have physically aged but because they have become more senior in their organization and have acquired,




FIGURE 8.1 Maturation, Generation, *Zeitgeist*, and Combined Effects in Values Change

for example, greater commitment, greater frustration, or a lower market value elsewhere. Seniority and age effects are not easy to separate; for a sample of 12 subgroups from the HERMES data, seniority and age were correlated across individuals between .52 and .76, with a median of .61. Seniority and age can be separated only by comparing cross-tabulations of either variable with the dependent variable, or, even better, by separating the values of young junior, older senior, and older junior respondents.

Maturation and generation effects are often confused. Complaints of older people about "young people today" have been found on an Egyptian papyrus manuscript. One of the oldest Greek texts preserved, Hesiod's *Works and Days* dated toward the end of the eighth century B.C., contains a pessimistic paragraph on the new generation in which "father will have no common bond with son" and "men will dishonour parents . . . and will blame and criticize with cruel words" (Hesiod, 1973: 64).

In data collected at one moment in time, maturation and generation effects cannot be separated. In longitudinal data (from at least two points in time) but without age differentiation of respondents, generation and *Zeitgeist* effects cannot be separated (this will be immediately clear from Figures 8.1a, b, and c). Only in longitudinal data with age differentiation can we separate the three effects.

Value Shifts in HERMES: Time Effects

For the questions in the HERMES questionnaire that were asked both in 1967-1969 and 1971-1973 and for which country differences were reasonably stable from one survey to the other, the score shifts over time have been analyzed (Hofstede, 1980b: chap. 8). The significance of the shifts (that is, whether they can be considered worldwide shifts) has been determined by the sign test across all countries surveyed twice: how many countries shifted in the same direction.

The shifts in the answers of HERMES respondents may, of course, be due to situational (HERMES-specific) causes as well as to shifts in values in the societies outside HERMES. From 1968 to 1972, HERMES' growth rate was considerably reduced. This meant less opportunities for advancement and more competition for resources within the company. The overall satisfaction of employees with the company, measured on a 7-point scale, was reduced in virtually all countries. The company climate became less benevolent.

Trends of Questions Related to Power Distance

Writing about social inequality, which we found in Chapter 3 (Figure 3.7) to be the core of the Power Distance societal norm, Bèteille (1969) states:

In spite of the great diversity of patterns, certain trends seem to emerge from a consideration of the events of the last hundred and fifty years. Everywhere there seems to have come about a steady erosion in the legitimacy accorded to social inequality. If social inequality continues to exist as a fact, it is no longer accepted by all as a part of the natural order but is challenged, or at least questioned, at every point. . . . The decline of the legitimacy of social inequality did not start everywhere at the same time and has not proceeded equally far in every society. But today there are few societies in the world where an ideology of inequality would be allowed to pass unchallenged [1969: 366-367].

This statement would lead to a prediction of a worldwide reduction in PDI. Obviously, the time span over which the trends in the HERMES data can be measured is very short: only four years (1968 to 1972). Still, if there is an overall decreasing trend, some of it should be visible even over so short a period.

The HERMES data show that from the three questions on which PDI is based, two indeed point to a decrease in the Power Distance norm worldwide: A54, the Preferred Manager, and A55, the Perceived Manager. From the correlated questions, another three point in the same direction. However, questions B46 (How frequently does it occur that employees are afraid to express disagreement with their managers?) and A52 (How often is your manager concerned about helping you get ahead?) show significant shifts in the opposite direction—that is, toward larger power distance. It may be that the shift on these questions is situationally determined: It can well be understood from the decrease of HERMES' growth rate (fewer actual possibilities for getting ahead) and the unfavorable shift in climate described above.

The phenomenon of the combination of negative and positive shifts in power distance can be better understood if we consider the countries with large PDI values (49 and over) separately from those with smaller PDI values (40 and under).

We then find that the increase in fear to disagree is virtually limited to the high PDI countries; on the other hand, the decrease in the perception of autocratic or persuasive behavior on the part of the manager is virtually limited to the smaller PDI countries. The only phenomenon that is common to both groups of countries is the decrease of respondents' preference for an autocratic or persuasive manager.¹

These figures bear resemblance to recent figures about the economic development of the world: All countries want development, but those which already have it are developing further at a faster rate than those which do not yet have it. As a result, the gap between wealthy and poor countries increases. In the case of power distance, all want it to be reduced; but only in countries in which it is already lower subordinates experience a reduction in power distance in their bosses' behavior; the others experience an increase in fear to disagree. Again, the gap between low PDI countries and high PDI countries increases rather than decreases; and it is, of course, no accident that the low PDI countries tend to be the wealthier ones as well. There is no support for a convergence theory according to which all countries move to a low PDI stable state. The range of scores (from the lowest to the highest country) on the various questions from 1967-1969 to 1971-1973 shows an increase rather than a decrease (for the % preferred manager 1 + 2 there is actually a modest decrease in range). Inequality perpetuates itself (Kohn, 1969: 200; Bèteille, 1977: 132ff).

Using the causal chain of Figure 3.8 we can understand the shift to a desire for more equality by the increase of technology which is indispensable for the survival of an increasing world population and the corresponding increase in education and development of middle classes. However, only in the low PDI countries does the system seem able to cope with the new middle-class values; in the high PDI cluster the rigidity of existing structures usually seems to resist change, and the shift to less directive relationships is slight, leading to an increase of frustration on the part of the middle strata. Studies like Crozier's (1971) about France² and Chaliand's (1976) about the less developed countries confirm this. It should be no surprise that PDI is ecologically correlated with domestic political violence (Chapter 3).

The difference in shifts among the three questions used to compose the PDI makes it undesirable to compute PDI shifts over time. These would represent a summation of heterogeneous elements. In order to study the shifts in the Power Distance societal norm, I shall use only question A54: the percentage of respondents preferring an autocratic or persuasive manager, which has decreased as much in the high PDI as in the low PDI countries.

According to the distinction introduced earlier in this chapter, we should investigate whether the shifts in the percentage preferring a certain type of manager are due to a maturation, generation, or *Zeitgeist* effect. For this purpose, I show in Figure 8.2 the percentage preferring manager 1 + 2 separately for seven large categories of employees (world totals), by age groups, by survey round (1967-1969 and 1971-1973).

In a diagram like Figure 8.2, a mere *maturation* (or perhaps *seniority*) shift would manifest itself in an overlap of the 1968 and 1972 curves: people in, for example, the 30-39 age bracket in 1972 would score exactly like those who were in the 30-39 age bracket in 1968. A *generation* shift would manifest itself in a horizontal shift of the curves by four years: The 30-39 age bracket of 1968 would have become a 34-43 age




FIGURE 8.2 Percentage of Respondents Preferring Manager 1 or 2 (Autocratic or Persuasive) for Seven Large Categories of Employees, Worldwide Data, by Age Group, at Two Points in Time

bracket in 1972, but it would have maintained its score level. A *Zeitgeist* shift would manifest itself in a vertical shift of the curve from 1968 to 1972, affecting all age brackets equally.

What Figure 8.2 shows is a combination of maturation and a *Zeitgeist* effect with little evidence of a generation effect,³ something like Figure 8.1d. The *Zeitgeist* effect varies by age bracket. It is lower for the very young (clerks and secretaries under 20) and for those over 40 (see the dotted vertical lines in the "managers" diagram of

Figure 8.2 as an example). For the (relatively small) groups over 50, the higher educated employees (managers and professionals) still show a reduction in preference for an autocratic or persuasive manager from 1968 to 1972, but the less educated employees (technicians and clerks) show a small *increase* rather than a reduction. If we compare the curves for higher educated employees to those of lower educated employees, we find that the former reach maturity (in the sense of a low need for dependence) later, but as they grow older they remain in touch with the *Zeitgeist* (the trends in society) longer. Less educated employees when they grow older even shift their values in a sense opposite to the trend in society.

As could be expected (compare Chapter 3, Figure 3.2) the overall level of preference for an autocratic or persuasive manager differs among employee categories: It is lowest for professionals and managers, medium for technicians, clerks, and secretaries, and highest for unskilled workers.

The increase in preference for an autocratic or persuasive boss for the higher age brackets points to a relationship between age and conservatism which is not surprising and which is, moreover, confirmed by other surveys (Hofstede, 1980b: 355).

The HERMES data do not allow us to distinguish between *maturation* and *seniority*. For three large employee groups, cross-tabulations of the preferred type of manager against age group and seniority category are available; in all three, the age (maturation) effect is stronger than the seniority effect, so that we may assume that physical age, rather than length of service with the company, explains the differences in type of manager preferred.

Trends of Questions Related to Uncertainty Avoidance

Uncertainty Avoidance, as we saw in Chapter 4, is related to levels of anxiety. In Chapter 4 I referred to a .73 rank correlation between UAI and a "neuroticism" or "anxiety" factor found by Lynn and Hampson in medical and related statistics for 18 countries. In a later phase of their research (Lynn, 1975; Lynn and Hampson, 1977) these authors did an analysis over time using data from 1935, 1950, 1955, 1960, 1965, and 1970.⁴ The five countries with the highest anxiety scores in 1935 were Austria, Finland, Germany, Italy, and Japan. The World War II axis powers and two countries which became involved in the war on their side. From 1935 to 1950, all countries defeated or occupied during World War II increased in anxiety level, while six out of the nine countries not defeated or occupied decreased in anxiety level. The mean anxiety scores across all 18 countries developed as follows (Lynn and Hampson, 1977: Table 5):

1935	1950	1955	1960	1965	1970
50.6	51.3	50.6	49.0	48.6	50.4

We see that the postwar increase of 1950 had disappeared in 1955, and that 1960 and 1965 were years of relatively low anxiety; this applies also to individual countries.⁵ From 1965 to 1970 there is a sharp increase in anxiety. It occurred in 14 out of the 18 countries; all except Finland, France, Japan, and Norway.

The 1965-1970 period overlaps partly with the 1968-1972 period for which longitudinal HERMES data are available. In fact, the latter show that question A37, the "stress" question which is one of the three used to compose the Uncertainty Avoid-

ance Index, does show a significant worldwide shift toward higher stress over this period.⁶ This shift occurs both in high UAI and in low UAI countries, although the countries with the highest stress in 1968 also show the largest increase, so that the gap between countries becomes wider (no convergence).

On the other hand, the two other UAI questions "rule orientation" (B60) and "employment stability" (A43) do not show significant worldwide shifts, neither for all countries nor for either high or low UAI countries.

Most questions correlated with UAI show shifts in the direction of greater uncertainty avoidance, except for B9, more people now preferring a manager career rather than a specialist career, and A58, lower overall satisfaction. Both can be explained from developments within HERMES.

All in all, there are indications of an increase in anxiety and related uncertainty avoidance attitudes in HERMES from 1968 to 1972, but UAI as computed for the comparison of countries at one moment in time does not seem to be the proper index to measure shifts over time; it is useless for this purpose as was PDI. In order to study the shifts in the Uncertainty Avoidance societal norm, I shall only use question A37, the "stress" question: "How often do you feel nervous or tense at work?" This is the only question out of the three from which UAI was computed to have shifted systematically worldwide. Rather than attributing these shifts to a change in a societal norm, we can postulate that they are also due exclusively to internal causes at HERMES (the less benevolent climate). However, two arguments speak against this: the fact that the shift confirms the increase in anxiety found by Lynn and Hampson for 1965-1970 on completely different data (see earlier pages) and the fact that, as we shall see below, the shift occurs across all employee categories which are, however, differently affected by the internal pressures of the company.

Analogous to Figure 8.2, Figure 8.3 presents the "stress" scores separately for seven large categories of employees (world totals) by age groups, by survey round (1967-1969 and 1971-1973). From Figure 8.3 we can read the following:

- (1) There is a maturation and a *Zeitgeist* effect, but no sign of a generation effect.
- (2) Most curves of stress against age are inverted U-shaped, which means that stress is highest for those in a middle age range (out of 12 curves, eight have their peak in the 30-39 age bracket).
- (3) There is a difference in the absolute stress levels of the occupation categories: the highest stress is found among unskilled workers and managers, the lowest among technicians (Hofstede, 1978c).
- (4) There is a systematic *Zeitgeist* difference between 1968 and 1972 data, with few exceptions, 1972 stress is higher for all occupational categories and all age brackets. The stress increase tends to be largest for the 20-29 and the 40-49 groups. In the case of those over 50, we find a decrease of stress for managers and professionals, but an increase for technicians and clerks. We saw on a previous page that the older, higher educated employees remain more in touch with the trends in society than do the older, lower educated employees. However, this does not seem to make their working lives more stressful. The decrease in stress for the managers and professionals in the 50-59 bracket shows that older people in higher qualified jobs have more opportunities to adapt their work situation to themselves than older people in less qualified jobs. However, for managers over 60 there is an increase in stress.




FIGURE 8.3 Mean Stress Scores for Seven Large Categories of Employees, Worldwide Data, by Age Group, at Two Points in Time (low scores mean high stress)

Trends of Questions Related to Individualism and Masculinity

The dimensions of Individualism and Masculinity have been measured through HERMES respondents' scores for the "work goal importance" questions (A5 through A18). Any shifts over time in individualism and/or masculinity should be